In this paper, we investigate the optimal selling scheme for a capacity-constrained seller who faces both aggregate demand and individual valuation uncertainties. As each consumer privately observes an initial estimate prior to the transactions and an updated information post-purchase, the problem exhibits the sequential screening feature and return policy emerges as part of the optimal selling scheme. We show that the optimal selling scheme nicely resembles the classical multi-unit auction design, and the product is returned too often compared to the efficient scenario. Furthermore, even though the post-purchase information update is privately observed by the individual consumers, the seller does not give away additional surplus to the consumers. Our general framework can accommodate various heterogeneities and uncertainties regarding hassle costs, shipping costs, salvage values, and reservation values. Our results go through even if the seller cannot commit to the refund amounts, the seller has flexible capacity, or consumers have multi-unit demands.
1.
Introduction. Consumer returns and partial refunds have become a common practice for numerous sellers, ranging from the traditional retailers to the Internet manufacturers/e-tailers and online auction websites. The primary reason for these manufacturers/retailers to accept consumer returns is that consumers may be exposed to their valuation uncertainties. Consumers may be unsure about the product quality in the absence of prior purchase experience; even if the product quality is commonly known, based on consumers' subjective preferences, the product misfit problem may arise. This phenomenon is pervasive in numerous industries such as airline, hotel, and fashion retailing; see Akan et al. [1] , Liu and Xiao [17] , Shulman et al. [29] , and Su [32] . Thus, generous return policies offer consumers a protection/insurance, mitigate their anxiety, and hopefully boost the demand in the end. Rogers and Tibben-Lemke [28] conduct a survey and find that among the respondents, 63 percent believe that one of the most important tools for Internet manufacturers/retailers to stay competitive is to offer clear and attractive return policies. In another two independent surveys (Pinkerton [27] and Trager [34] ), more than 70 percent of consumers claim that they typically evaluate return policies of the stores before they decide to shop. This concern is arguably more pronounced nowadays due to the rapid e-revolution, because consumers are unable to physically try either the experience goods or search goods if they purchase from homes through clicks (Moorthy and Srinivasan [22] ).
Confronted with consumers that exhibit (individual) valuation uncertainties, a crucial strategic decision is how the manufacturer/retailer (seller hereafter) should design his return policy. However, there are other concerns that make the seller's task particularly challenging. A notable common phenomenon is that the seller typically faces supply constraints. Traditional "bricks-and-mortar" retailers can only store up to their physical storage space; Internet retailers may be constrained by the contracts regarding the maximum number of units they are entitled to sell to consumers; the number of seats on a particular airplane scheduled at a specific time slot is fixed; in online auctions, the seller is typically endowed with a fixed set of objects for bidding. The second issue is that, in addition to the individual valuation uncertainty, the seller may not perfectly know the consumer population in certain scenarios as there are idiosyncratic factors that render perfect demand forecasting impossible (see Liu and Xiao [17] and Su [32] for more elaborations on this issue). Collectively, these two factors constitute another crucial concern for the seller, namely the resource allocation problem. This paper characterizes the optimal selling scheme that jointly determines the resource allocation and return policy for a capacity-constrained seller who faces both the aggregate demand uncertainty and individual valuation uncertainty. To this end, we consider a model in which a monopolistic riskneutral seller would like to sell homogeneous products to a population of heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations. The seller faces aggregate uncertainty regarding the population of active consumers that intend to purchase at most one unit of product, and each active consumer privately observes an initial estimate (the intrinsic value of the product) and an updated information (the product's fitness) that will be revealed only after obtaining the product. The seller is endowed with a finite capacity/inventory and intends to maximize his expected payoff. As the consumers are exposed to valuation uncertainties, a natural solution is to offer returns to the consumers so that a consumer experiencing a low valuation realization can return to the seller and get (partially) refunded. Consumers incur a hassle cost when they return the product, and the seller incurs a variable cost for shipping the product. The returned products cannot be resold to other consumers either by the original consumers or by the seller. The reservation value of unsold products and the salvage value of returned products need not be identical. Since consumers who obtain the products get an updated information regarding their true valuations, a two-stage adverse selection problem arises and the direct revelation mechanism must solve this sequential screening problem.
We first focus on a modified game in which the seller is able to observe the post-purchase information among all consumers. As this information structure unambiguously benefits the seller, this modified game gives rise to an upper bound of the seller's expected payoff. In the modified game, the only source of information asymmetry follows from the consumers' initial estimates. As the consumers' initial estimates are the only source of information asymmetry, the classical revelation principle applies directly. We show that, the optimal selling scheme in this modified game nicely resembles the classical multiunit auction design (Maskin and Riley [20] and Myerson [23] ), even though in our problem consumers exhibit aggregate as well as valuation uncertainties. As the seller has no access to the consumers' initial estimates, the product is returned too often compared to the efficient level. We also find that, the winner determination problem is reminiscent of that in the classical single-object auction problem, except that the virtual surplus, the maximum revenue that the seller can extract from an active consumer while inducing truth-telling, has to be modified to account for the return possibility.
We then study the original game and characterize a mechanism in which the seller can obtain the same expected payoff as in the modified game. Thus, even though this information update is "covert" (privately observed by the individual consumers but unobservable to the seller), the seller does not give away any additional surplus to the consumers. Furthermore, the resulting allocation among the consumers based on their initial estimates and the induced returns are exactly the same in the two games. We further show that, the seller can conceal the set of active consumers by appropriately designing the payment schedule. When all consumers are ex ante identical (but may possess heterogeneous initial estimates prior to the transactions), the optimal allocation can be implemented by all kinds of standard multi-unit auctions in which the highest bidders get awarded if their bids exceed certain reserve price. Notably, in our general framework, the seller may pay heterogeneous shipping costs for serving different consumers, consumers incur different hassle costs, and the salvage values of returned products from consumers need not be identical. While these heterogeneities and uncertainties may degenerate in certain scenarios, our paper hopefully provides a flexible framework with various practical components to be switched on and off by practitioners for different purposes. Moreover, our results go through even if the seller cannot commit to the refund amounts, the seller has flexible capacity, or consumers have multi-unit demands.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. Section 2 reviews some relevant literature. In Section 3, we lay out the model. Section 4 derives the optimal selling scheme. Section 5 discusses some variants of our model, and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks and research extensions. The appendix includes all the technical proofs.
2. Literature review. Our paper is related to a long-standing literature on product returns in economics and marketing, including Chu et al. [5] , Davis et al. [7, 8] , Hess et al. [12] , and Wang [36] . A series of recent papers by Shulman et al. [29, 30, 31] investigate the design of return policy in various contexts that include heterogeneous consumer tastes, the reverse supply chain structure, and manufacturer competition. As the product returns serve as a means to protect consumers against product and/or valuation uncertainty, our paper is also related to the large literature on product warranties. These papers either focus on the signaling perspective of the consumer returns or the insurance effect against consumers' risk aversion. In contrast, we introduce the aggregate and valuation uncertainties, and adopt the mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal mechanism. Our setting is in line with that of Padmanabhan and Png [24] , as the manufacturer (principal) there proposes the contracts to a set of Su [32] studies the impact of consumer returns on supply chain performance when the consumers exhibit valuation uncertainty and the manufacturer is confronted with demand uncertainty. As in his model all the consumers are ex ante homogeneous, consumer returns are necessarily efficient and there is no discrepancy between the socially optimal decision and the retailer's (seller's) optimal allocation. In contrast, we allow for heterogeneous consumers that possess different initial estimates ex ante. This creates two-stage screening -ex ante screening on the consumers' initial estimates and ex post screening on their updated valuations. We show that when consumers are ex ante heterogeneous, not only the first-stage allocation is distorted (as we use the effective virtual surplus to determine whether a consumer should be awarded the object), but the seller also induces the consumers to return the products too often. None of these two types of distortions arises in Su [32] . Some recent papers on strategic consumers also shed light on this dynamic selling problem. In Aviv and Pazgal [2] , Villas-Boas [35] , and Swinney [33] , the manufacturers are confronted with the consumers with heterogeneous preferences and prices are the only instruments available to the manufacturers. Thus, they intend to determine the prices over time in order to induce different consumers to purchase at different time epochs. This dynamic pricing problem is practically important, but is very different from the mechanism design problems. We show that the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism is not a simple dynamic price mechanism; rather, it is a two-stage auction that endogenously determines the transaction prices and allocations all together.
As we elaborate on the information asymmetry between the seller and the consumers, our research is built upon the mechanism design literature. Broadly speaking, the impact of information asymmetry is studied in the principal-agent framework in which the agent possesses private information that the principal attempts to elicit. In contrast with the earlier literature, we allow for the agents to obtain an updated information as the game proceeds. Thus, the sequential screening problem arises and a dynamic, multi-stage mechanism is required to induce truthful revelation. Our problem can also be regarded as an extension of Myerson [23] and Maskin and Riley [20] . The novel feature in our model is the aggregate as well as valuation uncertainties. Our approach to incorporate the aggregate demand uncertainty follows closely McAfee and McMillian [21] , where they focus exclusively on several well-known single-object auctions. In the double auction context, Chu and Shen [4] consider the shipping/transportation costs from the seller and consumers and investigate how these costs impact the design of socially desirable mechanisms. While we do not adopt this complicated two-sided competition into our model, the valuation uncertainty and the sequential screening problem have no counterparts in their paper.
There have been some recent papers on sequential screening, see, e.g., Battaglini [3] , Courty and Li [6] , Eso and Szentes [10] , Kakade et al. [13] , Pavan et al. [25, 26] , and Zhang and Zenios [39] . However, to our knowledge, none of them jointly incorporates the supply constraint and the aggregate uncertainty, which are the two primary components in this paper. Pavan et al. [25] consider a very general setting in which the agents receive new pieces of informative over time, and they find some sufficient conditions under which the principal can design the optimal dynamic mechanism via the first-order approach. In particular, the sufficient conditions entail an important periodic ex post incentive compatibility (i.e., each agent will report truthfully even if she has lied in earlier stages). This intriguing property is also investigated in another recent contribution by Kakade et al. [13] , where they demonstrate that in certain situations the only source of information rent arises from the initial information asymmetry prior to the contractual relationship. Although we also study the dynamic mechanism design and establish such an equivalence result between the original and modified games, this periodic ex post incentive compatibility necessarily fails to hold in our consumer return context. Thus, we provide a concrete and practical example for which the above approaches do not apply directly and yet the structural insights carry over.
Our framework is also closely related to that in Pavan et al. [26] , where they propose the independent shock setting in which the new piece of information is independent of the prior history (including the past actions and the agents' private information up to date). This independent shock framework allows them to provide more detailed characterizations of the optimal dynamic mechanisms; in our context, it facilitates the closed-form expressions of the first-stage allocations and the second-stage return strategies. In addition to the above long-term contracting approach, there are some papers that study the short-term mechanisms when the seller cannot commit to a grand mechanism up front such as Zhang [37] and Zhang et al. [38] . These short-term mechanisms are more complicated than their long-term counterparts, as the agents have to anticipate the principal's subsequent contract proposals that utilize their previous reports. In view of this, the classical revelation principle fails to apply, and some recent efforts are thus devoted to offering an efficient and systematic method to numerically compute the optimal mechanisms.
3.
Model. We consider a model in which a monopolistic risk-neutral seller intends to sell homogeneous products to a population of heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations.
Aggregate demand uncertainty. Specifically, let potential consumers be indexed by the natural numbers R = {1, 2, ...}, and let β A denote the probability that a finite subset A of R are active consumers. An active consumer would like to purchase at most one unit of the product, whereas an inactive consumer has no intention to purchase as the product generates no positive utility. In Section 5, we investigate the alternative model with multi-unit demands. For ease of presentation, with probability one the set of active consumers is finite, i.e.,
where |A| is the cardinality of A. The probabilities {β A }'s are commonly known to each consumer; they exogenously determine the selection process of the active consumers and consequently the number of active consumers faced by the seller. Thus, from an ex ante perspective, the seller faces an aggregate uncertainty regarding the population of active consumers. Conceptually, we can assume that each potential consumer is waiting for a call from "Nature." If she receives a call, her status becomes active and she has intention to purchase the product. Notably, once a consumer i is active, she has to update her belief regarding the set of active consumers she is competing with. The posterior belief that n active consumers are present (n ≥ 1 as she herself intends to purchase) is:
This allows us to introduce the stochastic population of active consumers and each active consumer is uncertain about the number of active competitors she faces.
Individual uncertainty. In addition to the aggregate uncertainty, we introduce the individual uncertainty in the following way. Consumer i's valuation is composed of two parts, v i = θ i + ϵ i , where the initial estimate θ i ∈ [θ i ,θ i ] is privately observed by consumer i ex ante and the realization of ϵ i ∈ [ϵ i ,ε i ] will be revealed only after obtaining the product. Thus, θ i can be interpreted as consumer i's ex ante type. From the seller's viewpoint, valuations are independent across different consumers (i.e., {θ i , ϵ i } and {θ j , ϵ j } are statistically independent). We also assume that θ i and ϵ i are independently distributed, and ϵ i has zero mean. This implies that θ i is the ex ante unbiased estimate of consumer i's actual valuation.
As indicated by Liu and Xiao [17] , an alternative interpretation of θ i and ϵ i is that θ i is the intrinsic value of the product, whereas ϵ i corresponds to the product's fitness which is revealed only after purchase. Given the independence between θ i and ϵ i , we use F i and G i to denote the prior distributions of θ i and ϵ i , respectively, and use f i and g i to denote the corresponding density functions. To facilitate our analysis, we impose the following regularity condition as in Assumption 3.1.
This assumption is also known as the monotone hazard rate (MHR) property, and it is widely adopted in the screening literature to rule out the possibility of bunching phenomenon. Our results go through if a weaker condition is imposed, namely J i (θ i ) ≡ θ i − H i (θ i ) is increasing. The bounds θ i + ϵ i should be non-negative, andθ i andε i can be either finite or infinite.
Consumer returns. The seller is endowed with a finite capacity/inventory, denoted by I, and intends to sell them to the consumers to maximize his expected payoff. As the consumers are exposed to valuation uncertainties, they may be hesitant to purchase the products at the first place. To overcome such a difficulty, a natural solution is to offer returns to the consumers so that a consumer experiencing a low valuation realization can return to the seller and get (partially) refunded. Consumers incur a hassle cost when they return the product. This hassle cost (return cost), labeled as C b i , may correspond to the transportation costs they incur, their time values, and the waiting costs upon revisiting the stores. Note that we allow the hassle cost to vary across consumers, as different consumers may have heterogeneous time values, transportation costs, and etc. Likewise, the seller incurs a variable cost C s i to ship the product to consumer i, and shipping costs may differ across consumers (which essentially captures the geographic locations of consumers and the different carriers consumers may require).
Upon receiving the return, the seller can salvage the returned product at an exogenous value S i . This salvage value has incorporated the possibility that after receiving the product, the consumer may either intentionally destroy the product (the moral hazard problem) or accidentally break the box/package in a rather violent way. Naturally, this value may be lower than the original reservation value of the seller, denoted as R, as the opened products are harder to sell and the seller may incur some cost for repackaging the product and putting it back to his storage space. In other words, we can assume that 0 ≤ S i < R; however, our results do not rely on this assumption. We exclude the possibility of reselling the returned products either by the consumers or by the seller; this is appropriate when recertification is very expensive for the seller and it is difficult for consumers to find the secondary market. We normalize the reservation utility for the consumers to zero, regardless of their ex ante estimates of valuations.
1 Additionally, the seller cannot determine the production quantity after interacting with the active consumers because we treat the inventory/production quantity as a relatively long-horizon decision, whereas the aggregate uncertainty and consumers' valuation uncertainty may appear in every period within the planning horizon. The alternative scenario with flexible capacity is investigated in Section 5.
Dynamic mechanism design. The seller's goal is to maximize his expected payoff, taking into account the valuation uncertainties and the potential returns. Confronted with heterogeneous consumers with ex ante estimates of their valuations, the seller faces an adverse selection problem as he has no access to these private estimates. Thus, according to the agency theory, he should design an appropriate mechanism that elicits information from the consumers (agents) voluntarily. While the set of possible selling schemes is enormously huge, we can invoke the revelation principle to confine our search within the family of direct revelation mechanisms. In these direct revelation mechanisms, the seller simply requests the consumers to report their private information and selects the contract terms accordingly. We assume that the seller can commit to the "long-term" mechanism and will not renege in the case of returns or leftover inventory. The possibility that the seller reneges on accepting returns is discussed in Section 5, 1 Our model can accommodate other associated costs easily. For example, the consumers can incur some extra cost or utility upon receiving the product (i.e., the time value for opening the box, the joy for trying the product for a short period of time). Furthermore, since the seller and the consumers are all risk neutral, we could also add some future uncertainties on their utilities (random noises that are resolved only when the products have been used for a period of time). All these additional factors can be incorporated into our flexible framework. Furthermore, even though for ease of exposition we assume that the only uncertainty arises from the aggregate demand and consumers' valuations, we can incorporate other types of uncertainties including the consumers' hassle costs, the seller's shipping cost, the salvage value, and the reservation value.
and Section 6 elaborates more on other possible consequences of this commitment issue. In what follows, we call the consumers who receive the products the "winners," and those who do not receive any product the "non-winners."
Note that since consumers who obtain the products get an updated information ({ϵ i }'s) regarding their true valuations, a two-stage adverse selection problem arises and the direct revelation mechanism must solve this sequential screening problem. In the first stage, the seller requests the consumers to report their initial estimates ({θ i }'s) and determines whom to award the products to. In the second stage, as the winners observe their true valuation (due to the new information regarding {ϵ i }'s), the seller requests them to report these valuation updates and decides whether to have the products returned. In the presence of capacity constraint, the payoffs among different consumers are interdependent. Furthermore, as these consumers are privately informed, in principle the seller may influence their expected payoffs and consequently their behaviors by disclosing partially or fully the information that the seller collects in the first stage. That is, the seller decides whether to withhold all the first-stage reports or disclose a subset or the entire set of them. This subtle point can sometimes be bypassed in other contexts of dynamic mechanism design with multiple agents. For example, in Pavan et al. [25] and Kakade et al. [13] , when restricting the attention to the periodic ex post incentive compatible mechanisms (i.e., each agent will report truthfully even if she has lied in earlier stages), it is without loss of generality to allow the seller to conceal all the first-stage reports. Nevertheless, as we demonstrate in Section 4, this periodic ex post incentive compatibility necessarily fails to hold in our consumer return context.
Solution approach.
In our multi-agent context, another crucial issue is the seller's information disclosure policy after the first stage. Since these consumers cannot communicate with each other before the second stage, there are various ways for the seller to disclose the information exchange between him and the consumers in the first stage. For example, the seller can commit not to disclose anything or commit to disclose everything. Moreover, the seller can disclose the first consumer's report to the second consumer, the second consumer's report to the third one, and so on. The seller can even disclose the highest bid to the second highest bidder, the first and second highest bids to the third highest bidder, and the first three bids to the fourth one. These potentially may result in different strategies in the second stage directly and different strategies in the first stage indirectly; consequently, they could lead to different expected payoffs for the seller. These formulations are conceptually simple but notation-wise very tedious. This issue vanishes if we either study a single-agent problem or remove the linkage across different agents. Nevertheless, the seller's capacity constraint necessarily creates interconnections among multiple agents and this information disclosure cannot be blindly ignored.
To overcome this, our strategy is to first focus on a modified game in which the seller is able to observe the post-purchase information ({ϵ i }'s) among all consumers (including the winners and non-winners). As this information structure unambiguously benefits the seller, this modified game gives rise to an upper bound of the seller's expected payoff.
2 Note that we do not intend to claim that this modified game corresponds to any specific practical situation, as the seller has access only to the new piece of information ({ϵ i }'s) but there is no way to ex post verify whether the consumers' reports regarding their initial estimates ({θ i }'s) are correct. Furthermore, that the realizations of {ϵ i }'s from the nonwinners are publicly revealed is only made possible conceptually, and in reality this could never happen in the absence of actual post-purchase experience. In our view, this modified game serves only as a hypothetical/theoretical benchmark that allows us to establish the seller's maximum expected payoff for the original game we wish to study. Following this, we then return to the original game and restrict our attention to the family of mechanisms in which the seller commits to announce all the first-stage reports in public. We show that within this restricted family of mechanisms, the seller can obtain the same expected payoff as in the modified game. This implies that the optimal mechanism in this restricted family is also optimal among all possible mechanisms as it achieves the upper bound of the seller's expected payoff. As we first identify an upper bound and then construct a feasible solution that reaches this upper bound, our approach follows closely the convention of optimization theory. In the mechanism design literature, this idea is also adopted in Eso and Szentes [10, 9] , albeit in two very different settings. 
probability that consumer i will be awarded the product y
probability that a winner i keeps the product t
second-stage payment in the original game ξ i winner i's report of her post-purchase information in the original game
seller's expected payoff in the original game It is worth mentioning that we interpret the active set as a way to capture the consumers' endowed intention to purchase, and interpret the consumers' preferences by their initial estimates and ex post information updates. Based on this interpretation, the active set and the consumers' valuations correspond to the consumers' intrinsic attributes and should not depend on the manufacturer's mechanism and return policy. However, these strategic decisions do affect the ex post behavior of consumers regarding whether they should actively participate in the mechanism. For example, if the refund amount is very stingy, the consumers, despite being active ex ante, may be discouraged to participate in the mechanism. This is because consumers may be very concerned about the possibility that she obtains an unfavorable update ex post; thus, ex ante her bidding behaviors shall be affected by the manufacturer's return policy. In the recent literature on consumer returns, this interpretation is also adopted and the ex ante and ex post linkage is also pointed out in Akan et al. [1] , Liu and Xiao [17] , and Su [32] . In these papers, the manufacturer's return policies cannot affect directly the demand distribution or the proportion of consumers that possess high valuations. Nevertheless, they affect how these consumers, once present in the problem, decide whether to purchase the products and whether to return the products.
Throughout this paper, we implicitly assume that Fubini's theorem can be applied to interchange integrals and expectations. This is a standard assumption adopted in the mechanism design literature and it can be enforced, for example, by assuming that all the supports of valuations are bounded. In the next section, we provide the characterizations of the optimal mechanisms in the modified and the original games.
Optimal selling schemes.
In this section, we first characterize the optimal direct revelation mechanism assuming that the seller can observe the post-purchase information of those winners. Following this, we demonstrate that the same expected payoff can be obtained in our original game. For ease of presentation, we summarize the notation used in this section in Table 1 .
The modified game.
In the modified game, the only source of information asymmetry follows from the consumers' initial estimates ({θ i }'s). As the consumers' initial estimates are the only source of information asymmetry, the classical revelation principle applies directly.
Sequence of events.
The sequence of events proceeds as follows. At the beginning of the game, Nature selects a subset of consumers to be active (denoted as A). Each active consumer obtains her initial estimate regarding her valuation, whereas inactive consumers receive a null payoff and leave the game. Afterwards, the interactions between the seller and the active consumers take place in two stages. In the first stage, the seller requests the consumers to report their initial estimates {θ i }'s (whereas inactive consumers can and will choose not to respond at all). Accordingly, he determines the probabilities that each consumer i will be awarded the product, labeled as x A i (θ i , θ −i ). In the second stage, after observing the post-purchase information, the seller determines the probability that a consumer i, conditional on being awarded one unit of product, keeps it in the end. Let y A i (θ i , θ −i , ϵ i ) denote this probability given that consumer i is awarded the product. Finally, the consumers pay the associated payments {t
Note that the consumers' reports may be different from their true initial estimates.
From the above descriptions, we assume that the seller is able to track down the consumers' identities and can make the return policies (and refund amounts) contingent on the consumers' reports. The knowledge of consumers' identities is essential for the seller to design the asymmetric two-stage auction, and is in line with the convention of asymmetric auctions. Myerson [23] shows that if we account for this heterogeneous valuation distributions, the optimal auction is necessarily asymmetric; this is because the virtual surpluses depend on the bidders' identities and these are used extensively to determine the allocation. In this sense, the informational requirement in our setting is not more that that in Myerson [23] ; see Chapter 5 in the textbook by Krishna [14] for more discussions. This dependence on the consumers' identities is not required if the consumers' valuations arise from common distributions (as we discuss in Section 5).
as the vector of realized initial estimates for active consumers. From the superscript of {t
, the payment schedule depends on the set of active consumers; thus, the seller must implicitly disclose the set of active consumers to the public. As we verify below, this information disclosure is not required for implementing the optimal selling scheme. Furthermore, let Γ A denote the set of consumers that are awarded the products given the active consumers' reports of their initial estimates.
Incentive constraints.
To characterize the optimal selling scheme in this modified game, we shall start with the consumers' reporting strategies. Given that in the second stage a consumer, regardless of whether she is awarded the product or not, has no discretion to make any decision, this boils down to the first-stage, single-shot decision making problem. In the direct revelation mechanism, it is without loss of generality to focus on the equilibrium in which each active consumer reports truthfully. However, we need to ensure that no profitable deviation may arise. Suppose an active consumer i's initial estimate is θ i but she reports it as w i . Assuming that all other active consumers report truthfully, consumer i's expected payoff based on this reporting strategy is
In (1), θ i +ϵ i is the actual valuation if she obtains the product and keeps it (which occurs with probability
is the return cost incurred in the event of returns (which occurs when she is awarded the product but decides to return it), and the last term is the payment to the seller for participation.
In equilibrium, truth-telling must be induced, i.e., the consumer is weakly better off reporting her true initial estimate, thereby leading to the following incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:
Moreover, the mechanism must induce each active consumer to participate; consequently, the following individual rationality (IR) constraint must hold: demand and individual valuation uncertainties, the seller's expected payoff can be expressed as follows:
refers to the expected salvage value the seller collects if the product is sent to consumer i and gets returned, and
] corresponds to the expected reservation value of the remaining products kept by the seller. Note that in the last term, we have eliminated the conditional expectations for all possible realizations of post-purchase information ({ϵ i }'s), as they do not directly affect the seller's reservation value of the unsold products. Furthermore, this expected payoff is taken over all possible realizations of the set of active consumers. This essentially implies that the seller should specify the detailed allocation rules for all instances, because as an active consumer submits her report, she remains uncertain about the set of active consumers.
Finally, the following feasibility (F) constraints must be satisfied:
In constraint (F), (3) ensures that the probability of obtaining the product is well defined; (4) is the supply constraint, as the seller is endowed with only I units; in (5), the probabilities of keeping and returning the product are both well-defined; finally, (6) is made for completeness, as a non-winner cannot keep it (this would not matter as it never affects the problem).
Collectively, the seller's problem is formally formulated as follows:
, and (F )}, whose solution is provided in the next proposition. Define
and 1{·} is the indicator function.
Proposition 4.1 The optimal direct mechanism in the modified game works as follows.
• In the first stage,
among the I highest values, and x
• In the second stage,
• The seller's maximum expected payoff is:
Proposition 4.1 demonstrates the clear connection between the classical multi-unit auction design with our problem in which consumers exhibit aggregate as well as valuation uncertainties. To elaborate, let us first start with the keeping and returning probabilities in the second stage. When a winner is awarded the product, the post-purchase information ϵ i realizes. Recall that a winner i's aggregate valuation for keeping this product, θ i + ϵ i , is common knowledge. If the product is returned to the seller, the winner incurs the hassle cost C b i and the seller collects the salvage value of the returned product (S i ). Thus, in the absence of information asymmetry, the product should be kept in the winner's hand if and only
However, as the seller has no access to the consumers' initial estimates, the resulting keeping probability is inefficient (as
, and the product is returned too often compared to the efficient level. The term J i (θ i ) is well-known as the "virtual surplus" of a consumer with initial estimate θ i . In the context of optimal single-object auction design, this turns out to be the revenue the auctioneer can extract from the bidder under induced truth-telling (Myerson [23] ). Furthermore, as J i (θ i ) is increasing in θ i given the monotone hazard rate property of F i , conditional on winning the product, consumer i with a higher initial estimate also keeps the product more often ex post. This is because a higher initial estimate gives rise to a stochastically higher ultimate valuation; consequently, it is beneficial if the product is kept more often in the consumer's hand.
Having discussed the second stage return strategy, we now move to the first stage to interpret how the seller determines the winners. According to the allocation rule specified in Proposition 4.1, the seller ranks the active consumers' reports {θ i }'s based on {Z i (θ i )}'s. If there are more than I active consumers with Z i (θ i ) ≥ 0, he awards the products to the I active consumers with the I highest {Z i (θ i )}'s; otherwise, he awards the products to those consumers with positive {Z i (θ i )}'s. Recall that if the seller keeps the product, he obtains the reservation value R. On the other hand, if he ships one unit of product to a consumer at cost C s i , he expects to receive a return and salvage it at price S i whenever
Thus, from the social perspective, the aggregate benefit of shipping the product to a consumer is
where
] accounts for the expected gross payoff when the product is eventually kept in the consumer's hand, and
is the net expected payoff in the case of return.
Taking into account the virtual surplus that the seller can collect and substituting the optimal return strategy y
is precisely the imbalance between the seller's marginal benefits between shipping the product or keeping it himself. It is worth mentioning that in the classical single-object auction problem, the seller awards the object to consumer i if and only if J i (θ i ) ≥ 0 and she has the highest virtual surplus. In this sense, our results can be regarded as a (non-trivial) extension of Maskin and Riley [20] and Myerson [23] , and we demonstrate how the return possibility corrects the virtual surplus from the seller's perspective. Moreover, if we use a second-price auction in the first stage, the consumers will report their true initial estimates {θ i }'s, and E ϵi
will then correspond to the seller's optimal reserve price. This term is not necessarily the same as the seller's true reservation value (R), as in the classical single-shot auction the reserve price unambiguously exceeds the seller's true reservation value. This reserve price allows the seller to exclude some consumers with relatively how initial estimates, and the same allocation can be implemented alternatively by an entry fee. The revenue equivalence result (which we verify to hold in our analysis) indicates that if the above reserve price scheme is implemented, the seller attains his maximum expected payoff. Incidentally, under such a selling scheme he does not request the consumers who do not receive the product to pay.
It is relatively straightforward to conduct some comparative statics for the allocation rule in both the first and second stages. For example, it is verifiable that if the shipping costs ({C s i }'s) are higher, the seller intends to withhold the products more often; likewise, higher hassle costs from the consumers' side also increase the likelihood of no transactions at the first place, as the seller correctly anticipates that he needs to compensate the consumers' hassle costs in the case of returns. When either {F i }'s or {G i }'s are not identical across consumers, inefficient allocation in the first stage may occur based on {Z i (θ i )}'s. This result has been documented in Myerson [23] for the classical single-object auction design problem with asymmetric/heterogeneous bidders. Here, the inefficiency is more pronounced. Even if the prior distributions of the active consumers' initial estimates are identical, the post-purchase information may not necessarily be identically distributed across them.
We have now characterized the structural properties of the optimal mechanism in the modified game. Next, we proceed to study the original game and evaluate the similarities and differences between these two games.
The original game.
We now return to the original game in which the seller is unable to observe the consumers' updated information. In such a scenario, the seller faces a sequential screening problem as the consumers privately receive their initial estimates and those awarded the products observe their true valuations post-purchase. Thus, we adopt a two-stage reporting system for our direct revelation mechanism. Two-stage mechanism. We follow the same notation {x 
, the seller discloses all the reports in the first stage (as observed from the contingency on θ i and θ −i ). In this (original) game, the consumers' firststage reports may be different from their true initial estimates; moreover, the winners may lie regarding their post-purchase information. Thus, the two-stage direct revelation mechanism should provide the appropriate incentives to induce truth-telling in both regards. We assume that in the second stage, the seller does not require the consumers who do not receive the product to pay. In its most general form, the direct mechanism could incorporate this second-stage payment. However, as we demonstrate below, this is unnecessary as our proposed mechanism achieves the upper bound of the seller's expected payoff.
Consumers' return strategies. Given this two-stage process, let us first start with the second stage and investigate the winners' reporting strategies by backward induction. Since the seller has no access to their initial estimates, we should consider all possible subgames in which the winners may have lied in the first stage. Thus, suppose that consumer i, endowed with initial estimate θ i , reports it as w i and is awarded the product. As deviations can only occur unilaterally, we can assume that other consumers report truthfully. In such a scenario, if consumer i's post-purchase information is ϵ i but she reports it as ξ i , her expected payoff in the second stage would be
In equilibrium, the following second-stage incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied:
which applies only to the equilibrium path on which all the consumers report their initial estimates truthfully in the first stage.
Consumers' reporting strategies. We next investigate the consumers' reporting strategies in the first stage. When consumer i's initial estimate is θ i but she reports it as w i , her expected payoff is
where x A i (w i , θ −i ) corresponds to the probability that she is awarded the product, and t A i (w i , θ −i ) is the first-stage payment given her report of initial estimate. The term E ϵi {max ξi U i2 (ϵ i , ξ i |θ i , θ −i , w i )} arises from her second-stage expected payoff. Specifically, when consumer i wins the product in the first stage, she receives the product and observes her true valuation (through the updated information ϵ i ). However, given that she has lied in the first stage, (IC-2) does not necessarily guarantee that she reports truthfully in the second stage. Thus, she has the discretion to choose any reporting strategy in the second stage, thereby leading to the term
In equilibrium, the following constraints should be satisfied:
which ensure that each active consumer is willing to report her initial estimate truthfully and participate.
Seller's problem. Let us now return to the seller's problem. His expected payoff can be expressed as follows:
In ( Proposition 4.2 shows that even if the post-purchase information is covert, the resulting allocation rule is exactly the same as if the seller is able to observe this updated information directly. Moreover, the seller does not incur any loss for the lack of this information (as he obtains the same expected payoff). This implies that the informational advantage regarding the post-purchase update does not warrant any excess surplus for the consumers, and the seller appropriates the benefit in this aspect by designing the optimal return strategies. Consequently, the consumers' information rent arises entirely from the private observations of their initial estimates. Notably, in our setting an active consumer will update her beliefs about the set of active consumers. This updating factors into the seller's objective function, and while announcing the two-stage mechanism the seller still possesses his prior belief about the set of active consumers. This subtle difference does not materialize in the seller's expected payoff in our context because the seller can request the consumers to report and then determine the allocations after collecting all the reports/bids. In this sense, under our optimal selling scheme the seller has already taken this piece of information into account. In the classical single-shot auction setting (Myerson [23] ), each bidder also "updates" first her valuation before the seller sees the bids; however, as long as the seller can make the allocation contingent on the bids (bidders' reports), the mechanism utilizes this information and gives rise to the maximum expected payoff for the seller. In our context, this idea applies not only to the initial estimates but also to the Bayesian updating of the number of active consumers.
While formulating the seller's problem, an implicit assumption is that the payments {t A i1 (θ i , θ −i )}'s and {t A i2 (θ i , θ −i , ϵ i )}'s depend on the set of active consumers, which implies that the seller must implicitly disclose the set of active consumers to the public. As we demonstrate in the following corollary, we can conveniently make the payments in both stages independent of the set of active consumers. This implies that the seller need not reveal this information to the consumers if it might be a concern in certain scenarios. It is worth mentioning that according to our optimal mechanism, the first-stage allocation is inefficient and requires the seller to publicly announce the reserve prices prior to the consumers' reports. This is implementable only when the seller can credibly commit to withhold the unsold objects. In addition, the return policies also require the seller's commitment power, for otherwise the seller may renege upon receiving the consumers' return requests. This is in line with the classical auction design literature where the seller can commit not to resell the object even if the reserve price is not met. In the absence of this commitment, an important issue arises from the strategic consumer behavior. As the consumers may anticipate this, the seller is confronted with the time inconsistency problem and therefore may be forced to give away more surplus to the consumers. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the possible challenges one may encounter when this commitment issue comes in to play.
We have obtained the optimal selling scheme and demonstrated the tight connection between our problem with the classical multi-unit auction design. A natural question is whether these results are robust against our specific choices of model characteristics. In the next section, we proceed to investigate some alternative models and extensions.
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Ex ante identical consumers.
We now briefly discuss a special case in which all consumers are ex ante identical. In other words, the prior distributions of their initial estimates and post-purchase information do not depend on the consumers' identities. Furthermore, the associated costs and salvage values are assumed to be common across consumers. In such a scenario, we drop the indices in the distributions so that
, and etc. We can then denote the ranking order as
which implies that the allocation is not consumer-specific; thus, the seller's knowledge about the consumers' identities is unnecessary. This, together with the monotonicity of J(θ i ), implies that we can implement the first stage allocation by all kinds of standard multi-unit auctions in which the highest bidders get awarded if their bids exceed certain reserve price. As the consumers have single-unit demands, we can simply adopt the uniform price auctions in which each consumer is requested to submit a bid, and set a reserve price accordingly. Following [20] , it is verifiable that this reserve price depends only on the seller's inventory I but not on the number of active consumers. As the calculation of the reserve price is straightforward and the arguments are standard in the literature, we omit the details.
Commitment issue on consumer returns.
To implement our optimal two-stage selling scheme, it is essential that the seller has to commit to the long-term mechanism. This is in line with the classical auction design literature where the seller can commit not to resell the object even if the reserve price is not met. This commitment power allows the first-stage payment to affect the second-stage refund (as t A i2 depends on θ i ). This dependence is intended to capture the phenomenon that a consumer who pays more for obtaining the product should be entitled to get refunded more if she finds the product inappropriate. This connection has been elaborated in a couple of existing papers and is used to design a menu of refunds with different selling prices, see, e.g., Akan et al. [1] , Courty and Li [6] , and Liu and Xiao [17] .
In this subsection, we address one particular issue of non-commitment -that the seller cannot commit to the refund amount in the case of returns. In Section 6, we elaborate more on other possible commitment issues that arise in this dynamic setting. Recollect that in our optimal mechanism, the winner i keeps the product according to y (8) . In the absence of this commitment power, however, in the second stage the seller will only accept the consumer returns whenever the salvage value justifies so. Thus, the refund amount should be S i ; accordingly, the winner keeps the product if and only if her utility exceeds the refund net hassle cost, i.e., if and only if
implies that in this case the corresponding y
independent of the consumer's first-stage report (bid). In such a scenario, the optimal mechanism exhibits the following properties.
Corollary 5.1 Suppose that the seller cannot commit to the refund amount. Compared with the optimal two-stage mechanism, the optimal mechanism yields a strictly lower expected payoff for the seller and the seller accepts the returns less often.
While we relegate the detailed derivations of the seller's expected payoff to the appendix, it is helpful to elaborate on the revenue difference between the cases with and without commitment. The commitment issue arises in the second stage when the seller decides whether to accept the consumer returns. Comparing (8) and (12), we observe that the seller's commitment power does not influence his revenue if the ultimate ownership remains the same. In other words, when either J i (θ i ) + ϵ i − S i + C b i < 0 (under which the consumer returns the product in both cases) or θ i + ϵ i − S i + C b i > 0 (under which the consumer keeps the product anyway), the commitment issue leads to no real effect. Nevertheless, recall that the revenuemaximizing mechanism requires the seller to accept the returns more often than he would like ex post. In the absence of commitment power, the seller is unable to follow through his plan and he tends to refuse these inefficient consumer returns. This leads to a higher allocative efficiency ex post, but it turns out to be detrimental to the seller ex ante. Anticipating the seller's ex post return policy, consumers then
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adjust their reporting strategies in the first stage. This restricts the seller's ability to differentiate among the consumers based on their willingness to pay (as the degree of freedom is reduced by his inability to commit). This result is related to the classical single-object auction setting when the auctioneer cannot commit to the reserve price. In that case, he necessarily has to leave more information rent to the bidders even though the allocative efficiency is improved.
Flexible capacity.
In our model, we assume that the seller is endowed with an exogenous capacity. In reality, there might be other scenarios in which he can determine the capacity after collecting the consumers' requests (reports). To accommodate this flexibility of capacity decision, we assume that instead of being endowed with a fixed capacity I, the seller is able to make production at a constant marginal cost k. This cost may correspond to the seller's own production technology if he is the manufacturer, or the wholesale price the seller, as a retailer, pays to his manufacturer to acquire the products. Naturally, the marginal cost should exceed the reservation value for keeping the products (otherwise the seller makes a profit by producing the products and withholding them); thus, we assume that k ≥ R. In this alternative scenario with flexible capacity, we show that the optimal selling scheme shares a similar structure.
Proposition 5.1 With flexible capacity, the allocation rule {x
A i (θ i , θ −i ), y A i (θ i , θ −i , ϵ i )} is
identical to that specified in Proposition 4.1 except thatẐ i (θ i ) is used to replace Z i (θ i ), and the seller need not disclose the set of active consumers.
As anticipated, when the capacity is flexible, the marginal production cost (k) becomes the opportunity cost for selling the products to the consumers. In our original model, the seller is endowed with the fixed capacity and is able to claim the reservation value R by withholding them. Thus, in this alternative scenario, the role of R is replaced by k, and everything else goes through in a straightforward manner.
It is worth mentioning that this flexible capacity scenario is different from the endogenous capacity scenario in which the seller must decide, prior to the interactions with consumers, the capacity to sell. In this case, capacity is inflexible but can be endogenously determined. Since we can obtain an analytical expression of the seller's optimal expected payoff for a given capacity level, our analysis allows us to calculate the incremental value of the capacity. This is spiritually in line with the shadow price of capacity. However, as the capacity is discrete, this endogenous capacity problem becomes a mixed integer program: the allocations, the return policies, and the transfers are continuous, but the capacity choice is discrete. This prevents us from using the shadow price analysis directly and our results only quantify the incremental benefit of having one extra unit of capacity. As it can be verified that the incremental benefit decreases in capacity, some notion of marginal cost-benefit analysis may be applied to study this endogenous capacity problem.
Multi-unit demands.
We have restricted our attention to the case when consumers demand at most one unit of products. However, it is possible that each consumer may intend to purchase multiple units (as back-ups, gifts for family and friends, and etc.). In order to accommodate the consumers' multiunit demands, we shall modify the setting as follows. We denote each consumer i's utility as V i (x i , θ i +ϵ i ), where x i is the quantity and v i = θ i + ϵ i serves as an index of her willingness to pay. Note that when
, this degenerates to our single-unit demand model. As in our basic model, an active consumer observes θ i before transactions and learns ϵ i post-purchase. In compliance of the mechanism design literature, we adopt the following regularity assumption. With single-unit demands (as in our basic model), these assumptions are automatically satisfied.
Assumption 5.1 The first and second derivatives of
as the second and third partial derivatives of V i (x i , v i ), respectively. The following properties are satisfied.
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The first condition shows that the utility function is increasing and concave in quantity. The existence of x e i (v i ) and the lower bound of V i1 (x i , v i ) under certain range rules out the trivial case in which no transaction is profitable even under complete information. The second condition gives a complete ordering for the consumer type: given the same quantity x i , a higher-type consumer obtains a higher utility than a lower-type one. The third condition includes the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition, and a sufficient condition to ensure that local maximum solutions (from the consumers' perspective) be globally optimal. These conditions are adopted directly from the literature.
As the transactions may involve multiple units, we should interpret all the associated costs and values in their marginal terms. For example, C b i is the marginal return cost consumer i incurs while sending back the product; likewise, C s i is the seller's marginal shipping cost to consumer i. The marginal reservation value and salvage value are denoted as R and S i . Except these modifications, we keep all other model characteristics and the sequence of events the same as those in our basic model (i.e., the seller is endowed with a fixed inventory and is unable to observe the consumers' initial estimate as well as post-purchase information, and etc.). We find that our main results continue to hold when consumers may demand multiple units.
Proposition 5.2 With multi-unit demands, even if the seller does not observe the post-purchase information, he can achieve the maximum expected payoff as if this information is public. Furthermore, in
the optimal selling scheme the seller need not disclose the set of active consumers.
Conclusions and discussions.
In this paper, we characterize the optimal selling scheme to heterogeneous consumers with both aggregate demand and individual valuation uncertainties. We show that, even though the post-purchase information update is privately observed by the individual consumers but unobservable to the seller, the seller does not give away any additional surplus to the consumers. We also find that, the optimal selling scheme nicely resembles the classical multi-unit auction design, and the product is returned too often compared to the efficient level. The winner determination problem is reminiscent of that in the classical single-object auction problem, except that the virtual surplus has to be modified to account for the return possibility. When all consumers are ex ante identical, the optimal allocation can be implemented by all kinds of standard multi-unit auctions in which the highest bidders get awarded if their bids exceed certain reserve price. Our general framework can accommodate heterogeneous shipping costs to different consumers, consumers may incur different hassle costs, and the salvage values of returned products from consumers need not be identical. Moreover, our results go through even if the seller cannot commit to the refund amounts, the seller has flexible capacity, or consumers have multi-unit demands. On the methodological side, we establish the unambiguous upper bound via the modified game, and then propose one specific mechanism in the original game that attains this maximum. This approach bypasses the tedious formulations of problems under various information disclosure policies between periods, and may find its applicability in different contexts with multiple agents Our analysis certainly has its limitations. For example, in our model we focus exclusively on the monopoly setting; in reality, however, competition is ubiquitous. Introducing seller competition is certainly an exciting and very important step towards a thorough understanding of the strategic role of return policies. However, in the auction/ mechanism design literature it has been recognized as a very challenging problem. When we allow multiple manufacturers to design the mechanisms simultaneously, the common agency problem arises in its full force (see the survey chapter Martimort [18] and the references therein). Since each manufacturer will try to influence the consumers' actions, this common agency setting is much more complicated and many technical issues could arise. The primary barrier in this area is the complete breakdown of revelation principle because the manufacturers (principals) may coordinate their decisions through the agent's responses that are not included on the equilibrium path. This implies that it is not without loss of generality to study the direct revelation mechanisms, and the set of potential mechanisms could explode. As in our setting the consumers' valuation updating necessarily leads to a dynamic mechanism design problem, the seller competition creates intriguing dynamic interactions between sellers and consumers. We expect more distortions may arise in both the initial allocations and the ex post returns. This conjecture is in line with the literature on common agency problems as competing principals/ auctioneers may create additional distortions intentionally. However, a thorough investigation is required to validate or invalidate our conjecture.
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Another possible extension is to incorporate more dynamic components as in Aviv and Pazgal [2] , Swinney [33] , and Villas-Boas [35] . For example, if the seller cannot commit to a two-stage mechanism, he may attempt to sell the leftover inventory via a second-round auction. Additionally, the returned product may still be valuable to some consumers who do not win in the first stage. Thus, upon receiving the consumer returns, the seller may also auction separately those returned products to the remaining consumers rather than salvaging them directly in the secondary market. In this case, we may have to formulate the problem as a dynamic multi-stage, non-repeated auction with both brand new products and returned products. However, as indicated in the introduction, there is an intrinsic difference between our optimal mechanism design problem and those dynamic pricing problems. For example, dating back to the well-known Coase conjecture, it has been observed that when the seller cannot commit to the future pricing pattern, the optimal strategy is to simply set a single price in the first period at the marginal cost. In this sense, the dynamic version in this pricing problem may be "simpler." In the mechanism design literature, the lack of commitment power necessarily creates the short-term contracts or spot mechanisms. This problem is notoriously challenging especially when the agents' types may evolve over time. In the absence of commitment, renegotiation may take place, and there is no guarantee that the agents are willing to disclose their information in the early stages. Therefore, pooling contracts may emerge as an equilibrium outcome; see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole [16] and Chapter 9 in Laffont and Martimort [15] for more discussions. In this area, only a few attempts are successful such as Zhang [37] and Zhang et al. [38] , who offer an efficient and systematic method to compute the optimal mechanisms. In general, identifying structural properties may still rely on numerical experiments, and we suggest interested readers to follow closely the agenda laid out by Zhang [37] and Zhang et al. [38] along this exciting and challenging venue.
Furthermore, in various situations there can be correlation between initial estimates and valuation updates. Unlike our benchmark case, with correlation across stages the problem is not necessarily tractable. Even though the seller's expected payoffs in the modified and original games take very similar forms, one must verify that the candidate solutions satisfy the global incentive compatibility constraints as well. As in Pavan et al. [25] , we necessarily have to impose some distributional assumptions on the correlation structure, and a priori it is not clear whether these assumptions are reasonably mild. Additionally, the general conditional distributions are hard to work with and typically do not yield closed-form expressions. This is the primary reason why the existing literature assumes that the economic environments are somehow "separable" (see Pavan et al. [25] and Kakade et al. [13] ) or imposes first-order or second-order stochastic dominance (see Courty and Li [6] ). The independence assumption in our basic framework is in line with Pavan et al. [26] , and it in fact satisfies the first-order stochastic dominance if we treat θ i + ϵ i as the second-stage "type." Due to these technical difficulties, we relegate a thorough study on general autocorrelations to the future work.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider the impact of risk aversion on either the seller's side or the consumers' side. However, a potential concern is that this largely destroys the quasi-linearity of the problem. In the auction literature, or more generally, principal-agent problems with adverse selection, this quasi-linearity is necessary in order to facilitate the systematic approach. There are only a few papers that study the problems with risk-averse agents, but they typically impose very restrictive assumptions and mostly focus on suboptimal mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, Maskin and Riley [19] provide by far the most general framework for the optimal auction design with risk averse bidders. In their paper, a single object is offered for sale, the number of bidders is publicly known, and the bidders know their valuations without any information updating. Even in this extremely simplified setting, the problem is widely regarded to be intractable as Maskin and Riley [19] only provide some structural properties that optimal mechanisms may exhibit. There are also some recent papers that quantify the asymptotic performance gaps when the population of bidders approaches infinity (see, e.g., Fibich and Gavious [11] ). However, the optimal mechanism design problem is not touched upon. As our setting incorporates consumers' information updating, this dynamic mechanism design problem is significantly more complicated than the classical one-stage auction design problem. We hope that our effort invites further investigations to understand the non-trivial economic trade-off when both parties exhibit risk aversion.
Appendix A. Proofs. In this appendix, we provide the detailed proofs of our propositions and corollaries.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The proof procedure follows the standard literature of mechanism design. We first replace the incentive compatibility constraints of the active consumers by a set of weaker constraints. This gives rise to a relaxed problem of (P). We then characterize the optimal solution to the relaxed problem and show that it is also feasible to problem (P). Thus, it attains the maximum value and is indeed optimal.
Let us first rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints. Suppose that consumer i is active. From (IC), we obtain that
The envelope theorem thus implies that
Accordingly, the integral form is (from Fundamental Theorem of Calculus):
From the definition of U i (θ i ), we can express the expected payment
Now we return to the seller's problem. His objective can be rewritten as follows:
where in the last equality we have applied integration by parts (as
The expression in (14) shows that the seller's expected payoff is decreasing in U i (θ i ), and there is no linking constraint among these values. Thus, at optimality U i (θ i ) = 0.
We can now maximize the seller's expected payoff pointwise to obtain a candidate solution. From the terms associated with y A i (θ i , θ −i , ϵ i ), the proposed solution satisfies the following:
Given this strategy, we can express the seller's expected payoff as
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Recall that the feasibility constraint with respect to x
A i (θ i , θ −i ) requires: 0 ≤ x A i (θ i , θ −i ) ≤ 1, ∑ i∈A x A i (θ i , θ −i ) ≤ I, ∀θ i , θ −i , ∀i ∈ A.
As in (20) Π is linear in x
, it becomes a continuous knapsack problem. Thus, under the optimal allocation rule, we rank the active consumers' reports {θ i }'s based on {Z i (θ i )}'s. If there are more than I active consumers with Z i (θ i ) ≥ 0, we award the products to the highest I active consumers; otherwise, we award the products to those consumers with positive {Z i (θ i )}'s. This pins down {x
Finally, we can obtain an expression of the seller's maximum expected payoff as:
The above characterization yields a solution to the relaxed problem. To verify that this is indeed optimal, we shall show that this allocation rule also satisfies the (global) incentive compatibility constraint. To this end, given this allocation rule {x
and the corresponding payment schedule {t
As is standard in the literature, the necessary and sufficient condition is that
is monotonic in θ i . Since we assume the monotone hazard rate property on H i (θ i ), it can be verified that both
is simply an integration over monotonic functions and is itself monotonic as well. This establishes the incentive compatibility. Under this allocation rule, U ′ i (θ i ) ≥ 0. Together with U i (θ i ) = 0, we conclude that the individual rationality constraint is also satisfied. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
Our strategy is as follows. First, we start from the second stage and investigate the winners' reporting strategies by backward induction. Note that we need to characterize the winning consumers' second stage reporting strategies for all possible subgames. Second, we return to the first stage and derive the explicit expressions of incentive constraints (IC-1) and (IR-1). Following this, we apply the standard procedure of mechanism design to formulate the seller's relaxed problem (by ignoring some constraints). Finally, we verify that the proposed solution satisfies all the ignored constraints and therefore attains the optimum.
1) The second stage:
Suppose that the set of active consumers is A and consumer i wins the product. Let us first consider the equilibrium path on which consumer i reports her true initial estimate θ i in the first stage. From the definition of U i2 (ϵ i |θ i , θ −i , θ i ), we can write down the local incentive compatibility based on (IC-2) as
which has the following integral form: 
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Note that this does not uniquely pin down the payment schedule as
Let us now evaluate how a winning consumer determines her second stage reporting strategy if she has lied in the first stage. Recall that ϵ i is her post-purchase information and ξ i denotes her report of this information. We obtain that
where the inequality follows from (IC-2) for a consumer i whose true estimate is w i and the post-purchase information is θ i − w i + ϵ i . Thus, her optimal reporting strategy is to pretend that she receives an update θ i − w i + ϵ i . Furthermore, we find that
2) The first stage:
Having characterized the closed-form expressions of
} , we now return to the first stage. From the definition of U i1 (θ i , w i ), we obtain that
Thus, (IC-1) then implies the following local incentive compatibility constraint:
and consequently
From the definition of U i1 (θ i ), we can express the expected payment
3) The seller's problem:
Now we return to the seller's problem. His objective can be rewritten as follows: where we have replaced the expected payments. Recalling (21) and rearranging common terms associated with
by its integral form and obtain the following alternative expression ofΠ:
which is decreasing in U i1 (θ i ). Consequently, U i1 (θ i ) = 0 at optimality.
Using integration by parts, we can rewriteΠ as:
By pointwise optimization over y
and accordingly the seller's expected payoff becomeŝ 
Proof of Corollary 4.1. The first part is immediate as the expected payoff attains the maximum. Regarding the second part, suppose that there exists an optimal two-stage direct mechanism that implements {x
Consider the following alternative mechanism. First, from the proof of Proposition 4.2, we are able to freely choose
} that is independent of A without violating any constraint. Second, for any given {t
A:i∈A β A as the first stage payment in the alternative mechanism. Thus, we obtain that as an active consumer i with initial estimate θ i chooses to report w i , her expected payoff is ∑ A:i∈A
. For example, the consumer i's incentive compatibility becomes:
and the seller's objective is:
Thus, the proposed solution satisfies the following:
The feasibility conditions can be verified easily.
Note that this solution gives rise to a strictly lower expected payoff for the seller. Recall the definition ofŷ
, the mechanism with non-commitment induces the seller to refuse the socially inefficient return. It ultimately hurts the seller's ex ante expected revenue because
is negative in this case, whereas under the optimal mechanism it would be zero.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Since the proof procedure is very similar to those of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we only sketch the key steps. We first focus on the modified game in which the seller is able to observe the post-purchase information and obtained the upper bound of his expected payoff. Following this, we proceed to solve the original game and show that a specific mechanism achieves this upper bound and therefore is optimal. To demonstrate the close connection between this alternative scenario and our original model, we keep the same notation, to the extent possible, for consistency.
1) The modified game:
In this alternative scenario, (IC) and (IR) remain the same. The seller's objective becomes:
where k ∑ i∈A x A i (θ i , θ −i ) corresponds to the expected production cost. In the feasibility constraint (F), we should eliminate
The consumers' problems remain unchanged:
and the expected payment
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The seller's objective can be rewritten as follows:
which implies that at optimality U i (θ i ) = 0. Maximizing this objective pointwise, we obtain that
It is then straightforward to verify that all the incentive constraints are satisfied.
2) The original game:
As in Proposition 4.2, we start from the second stage and investigate the winners' reporting strategies by backward induction, and then return to the first stage and derive the explicit expressions of incentive constraints (IC-1) and (IR-1). Following this, we apply the standard procedure of mechanism design to formulate the seller's relaxed problem (by ignoring some constraints). Finally, we verify that the proposed solution satisfies all the ignored constraints and therefore attains the optimum.
In the second stage, as the capacity has been determined, the problem is exactly the same as our original model. We can then obtain the expressions of
, and a winning consumer' second stage reporting strategy if she has lied in the first stage. Following this, in the first stage, the consumers' problem does not depend directly on whether the capacity is endogenous or exogenous. Thus, the expressions of U i1 (θ i ) and the expected payment
) remain unchanged. Now we return to the seller's problem. His objective can be rewritten as follows:
which implies U i1 (θ i ) = 0 at optimality. Using integration by parts, we can rewriteΠ as:
Pointwise optimization gives us y A i (θ i , θ −i , ϵ i ), and accordingly the seller's expected payoff becomeŝ
Thus, the allocation rule {x
} in the original game is the same as that in the modified game andΠ =Π. The global incentive compatibility constraints (IC-1) and (IC-2) and the individual rationality constraint (IR-1) are trivially satisfied, and we can specify an alternative payment schedule that does not disclose the set of active consumers.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. We will follow the same proof procedure as in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 and sketch the key steps to avoid redundancy. Specifically, we first focus on the modified game in which the seller is able to observe the post-purchase information and obtained the upper bound of his expected payoff. Following this, we proceed to solve the original game and show that a specific mechanism achieves this upper bound and therefore is optimal. To demonstrate the close connection between this alternative scenario and our original model, we keep the same notation for consistency.
1) The modified game:
In the modified game, let us start with the consumers' reporting strategies. Let x A i (θ i , θ −i ) denote the quantity allocated to consumer i initially, and y A i (θ i , θ −i , ϵ i ) is the proportion of awarded products she keeps after receiving the post-purchase information. Suppose an active consumer i's initial estimate is θ i but she reports it as w i . Assuming that all other active consumers report truthfully, consumer i's expected payoff based on this reporting strategy is
In equilibrium, (IC) and (IR) constraints must be satisfied.
The seller's expected payoff can be expressed as follows:
and the feasibility constraint becomes: Finally, the following feasibility (F) constraints must be satisfied:
From (IC) of an active consumer i and the envelope theorem, we obtain that
with the integral form:
The seller's objective can be rewritten as follows: where we have applied integration by parts. This implies that at optimality U i (θ i ) = 0. Maximizing the seller's expected payoff pointwise, we obtain that y 
Define
We obtain its derivatives as: 
where the second equality follows from the optimality condition of y Riley [20] and show that x A i (θ i , θ −i ) is also monotonic in θ i , which then implies that the global incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied by our proposed solution. Constructing a payment schedule that conceal the set of active consumers is straightforward.
2) The original game:
We now return to the original game in which the seller is unable to observe the consumers' updated information. In such a scenario, the seller faces a sequential screening problem and we adopt a two-stage reporting system for our direct revelation mechanism.
Let us first start with the second stage and investigate the winners' reporting strategies by backward induction. Suppose that consumer i, endowed with initial estimate θ i , reports it as w i and is awarded the product. As deviations can only occur unilaterally, we can assume that other consumers report truthfully. In such a scenario, if consumer i's post-purchase information is ϵ i but she reports it as ξ i , her expected payoff in the second stage would be
Define U i2 (ϵ i |θ i , θ −i , w i ) ≡ U i2 (ϵ i , ϵ i |θ i , θ −i , w i ). Given this, we can then return to the first stage and investigate the consumers' reporting strategies. In this case, when consumer i's initial estimate is θ i but she reports it as w i , her expected payoff is
where the term E ϵi {max ξi U i2 (ϵ i , ξ i |θ i , θ −i , w i )} arises from her second-stage expected payoff. Define U i1 (θ i ) ≡ U i1 (θ i , θ i ). In equilibrium, (IR-1), (IC-1), and (IC-2) should be satisfied.
Let us now return to the seller's problem. His expected payoff can be expressed as follows:
and his problem can be formulated as follows: To solve problem (P), our strategy is as follows. First, we start from the second stage and investigate the winners' reporting strategies by backward induction. Second, we return to the first stage and derive the explicit expressions of incentive constraints (IC-1) and (IR-1). Following this, we apply the standard procedure of mechanism design to formulate the seller's relaxed problem (by ignoring some constraints). Finally, we verify that the proposed solution satisfies all the ignored constraints and therefore attains the optimum.
2-1) The second stage:
Let us start with the second stage. Suppose that the set of active consumers is A and consumer i wins the product. Consider the equilibrium path on which consumer i reports her true initial estimate θ i in the first stage. From the definition of U i2 (ϵ i |θ i , θ −i , θ i ), we can write down the local incentive compatibility based on (IC-2) as } as
Now we evaluate how a winning consumer determines her second stage reporting strategy if she has lied in the first stage. We obtain that
where the inequality follows from (IC-2) for a consumer i whose true estimate is w i and the postpurchase information is θ i − w i + ϵ i . It can then be verified that U i2 (ϵ i , θ i − w i + ϵ i |θ i , θ −i , w i ) = U i2 (θ i − w i + ϵ i |w i , θ −i , w i ).
2-2) The first stage:
From the definition of U i1 (θ i , w i ), we obtain that
